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Then is the American, This New Man?" Alongside work unmistakably influenced by the exceptionalist tradition, however, Schlesinger wrote essays stressing America's global relationships. His warning is instructive: "History as conventionally written stresses national differences-even when not genuinely such-to the neglect of national similarities. This emphasis," Schlesinger noted, glossed "over the fundamental interdependence of peoples."6 Schlesinger's essay was first published in 1941 under the title "World Currents in American Civilization." Even then, as a glance at his bibliography shows, a substantial literature on American connections with "world history" existed.7 The presence of this strand of historical writing suggests that American exceptionalism has not gone unchallenged. A subordinate tradition of international analysis requires recognition in any account of American exceptionalism. This tradition offers instructive themes for the reconceptualization of national historiography in the United States and in other countries as well. American historians have been prominent in the drive to establish comparative history as a genre, for example, and have heralded such efforts as evidence of greater cosmopolitanism in American historical analysis. Technically, they are correct. The critical absence has not been comparative and international perspectives themselves but rather the failure of comparative history to transcend the boundaries of nationalist historiography. As an alternative, the possibilities of a transnational history must be considered. This does not mean that nationalism and the history of the nation-state can be ignored. It does mean that these national perspectives must be historicized and relativized by developing a new historiographical project organized in terms of a simultaneous consideration of differing geographical scalesthe local, the national, and the transnational-in American historical thought.
The national focus I am criticizing here may seem merely to reflect a rock-bottom historical "reality."8 No one doubts the importance of both nationalism and the nation-state in the modern world. Yet, all too often, the primacy of these concepts is assumed by historians. This penchant for national frameworks reflects not merely the historian's common-sense observation of the contemporary world but also the way historical knowledge has been produced. History is not a set of data to be deposited into tidy boxes, of which the national box is the most obvious and sensible. History is, much more than most historians are willing to accept, a constructed body of knowledge.9 The role of the nation-state framework in the production of that history must be acknowledged, if alternative views of American history are to be advanced. Other disciplines have been much more open to transnational analysis than history has been, and even American historians, when they turn to the subject of European history, have made contributions to comparative and international history that demonstrate just how artificial the dominance of the national framework in American historiography can be.'0 But these innovative achievements have not been fully appreciated by other national contingents of historians. This suggests that the problem lies less in the facts of American history or American perversity than in the nature of historical training. A focus on national difference is an occupational hazard among all historians, not just those of the United States. American exceptionalism presents a special case of the more general problem of history written from a national point of view.
NONE OF THIS WOULD BE WORTH DISCUSSING if American history were truly exceptional, but exceptionalism has always contained an insuperable logical difficulty. The history of the United States cannot be exceptional unless contrasted with other histories that conform to fixed patterns of historical development. In the twentieth century, American advocates of exceptionalism have, paradoxically, been hostile to the very idea of laws of historical development represented in, for example, Marxism, and have argued that these schematic accounts do not apply to American history. Yet such schemes of history underpin the explanations exceptionalist advocates give for American difference from other countries. The logical difficulty has been compounded by changes in the Marxist tradition itself. Marxists no longer hold to a rigid stages theory of historical development, and the fragmentation of the Marxist tradition has removed the contrast on which modern interpretations of exceptionalism have been constructed. Added to this, the exceptionalist tradition assumed an essentialist dichotomy between "America" and "Europe" that denies the complexity and variation European historians-Marxist and non-Marxist-have found in their own histories." Many American historians have accepted these logical difficulties and argue instead either for national uniqueness or national difference. Since all national histories are unique, there is nothing objectionable about this maneuver, at least in principle. Yet "uniqueness" does have overtones of national superiority, and the concept has been used, for example by David Potter, in a sense that clearly implies exceptionalism. In his People of Plenty (1954), Potter reworked the familiar frontier thesis and explained differences between "Europe" and "America" in terms of American abundance. "Europe cannot think of altering the relationship between the various levels of society without assuming a class struggle; but America has altered and can alter these relationships without necessarily treating one class as the victim or even, in an ultimate sense, the antagonist of another."12 This polarized and ahistorical treatment of two worlds defined by the presence or absence of class conflict echoed the preoccupations of earlier writers like Turner and the nineteenth-century originators of exceptionalism.
Even the historians who have emphasized national difference in more neutral fashion have helped perpetuate the concern with exceptionalism. To understand this, it helps to put individual historical works in the context of inherited historiography and keep in mind that far more history is written about the United States than any other country. If the United States is said to be different, the sum total of that research produces more evidence of specifically American difference. All histories may be distinctive, but American history becomes, through the sheer volume produced, "more distinctive" than others. Further, the focus on American difference cannot be divorced from the context of exceptionalism as an inherited ideology. The historian may deny the notion of exceptionalism, but his or her analysis reinforces the existing, deeply ingrained assumption that the history of the United States has been endowed with special features until the contrary is proven.13 For these reasons, exceptionalism is in practice inseparable from the concept of national distinctiveness in American historiography, and the two notions have become linked through comparative history. Although comparative history is by no means an American monopoly, the search to define, explore, and test the uniqueness of the American past has produced an impressive body of comparative history by world standards. For many years, this link was merely implicit. Advocates of exceptionalism such as Turner assumed American uniqueness rather than investigated it. '4More recently, the growth of comparative history, in part a product of the consensus historians' preoccupation with American uniqueness, has allowed systematic testing of exceptionalist ideas.'5 Comparative history is for this reason not necessarily antagonistic to exceptionalism.
These connections are not always made clear by practitioners, and comparative history may sometimes be seen simply as a way of making the discipline in the United States more cosmopolitan.'6 But even the supporters of comparative history acknowledge that the genre has its defects. The most obvious problem is the tendency to compare whole countries and to take for granted the primacy of the national unit of analysis. (1964) . Here the liberal "fragment" derived from Europe's more complex social structure determines the nature of political debate. The fragment becomes frozen and loses its dialectical relationship with other fragments to produce a self-perpetuating "tradition." All major political and ideological developments can be explained in terms of such a national pathology.'8 It is not necessary to deal with an entire national tradition in order to fall into this error. Some local case studies do likewise. A well-crafted and informative comparison by Norbert MacDonald of the divergent histories of Vancouver and Seattle illustrates the point. Here are two similarly situated cities. Geographical influences are relatively constant, therefore a comparison may reveal something significant about the national scene. Such a comparison suggested to this author striking differences "in local characteristics and processes" that reflected "the distinctive histories, roles and values of two separate nations."'9 Urban history, in this account, is national history writ small. At least one reviewer understood the message to be that such a comparison showed up the distinctive national features of American history identified with exceptionalism.20 But how different would the perspective be if Vancouver were contrasted with other Canadian cities or port cities elsewhere in the world? We cannot know at present, because the research design in comparative history is narrowly conceived to test purely national differences rather than convey a more varied sense of the elements that make up the diversity of historical experience. The focus on national factors as an explanation of urban trendls ignores the very real uncertainty among Canadians about their national culture and their frank recognition of regional differences. It also fails to take into account the degree of American cultural penetration that makes a sense of "Canadian" difference impossible to measure in terms of a two-way national comparative framework.
Most comparative history involves just two countries, but the choice of countries for comparison is as important as the number of countries studied. Take the recent example of Donald Meyer's learned foray into feminist history, Sex and Power (1987 It should be clear by now that the critics of exceptionalism cannot defeat the notion by exposing its illogicalities or by using the methodology of comparative history. The legacy of exceptionalism can only be laid to rest in two ways: by confronting the national focus of exceptionalist analysis, and by dealing with the special conditions of historical production that have shaped and sustained exceptionalism through the organization of historical knowledge in national units. This is why exceptionalism must be linked to national history and why the paradigm of national history must be rigorously scrutinized from the perspective of alternative transnational approaches. I do not mean to suggest that American history must be homogenized as part of some amorphous international history. The alternatives to national history I propose would contextualize nationalism and depict U.S. history as a variation on transnational themes. specialization. Within U.S. history, slavery is still seen primarily as a unique phenomenon, to be compared with slavery in other national settings rather than as part of Atlantic history. Despite the value of these studies of the Atlantic world, they are mostly concentrated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, before the emergence of the American nation-state. Meinig has made clear that the successor volumes to his Atlantic America, dealing with the period after 1800, will return to a more traditional emphasis on what Americans have had in common rather than continue to focus on the regional diversity and Atlantic links that distinguished his first volume. This maneuver underscores the difficulty that even persistent advocates of geographical and environmental factors have in coming to terms with the cluster of ideological, social, and political developments transforming the American colonies into a nation in the age of the democratic revolutions. Any regional history with transnational implications faces this difficulty. Regional approaches are not going to be persuasive so long as they seem merely the precursors or the building blocks of a national story.
Another problem with the regional approach is the inability of any one regional frame of reference to encompass the sheer variety of Atlantic contacts has been the history of the United States. This is not a way to transcend the nation-state framework. Some transnational processes, moreover, have effects far beyond particular regions, even those as broad as the Atlantic system. There are strong arguments to be made in favor of approaches of a global kind, especially those that give proper place to local and national peculiarities. The most influential attempt at this type of transnational historical analysis has come from Immanuel Wallerstein and the world-systems theory he has promoted. Building on the insights of both Marx and Braudel, Wallerstein discussed the rise of capitalism since the fifteenth century as a "world-economy" that is not coterminous with national borders. He recognized the dominance of particular nation-states at various times in the "core" of the system and was also able to explain, through his model of core versus periphery, variations in state structure and labor systems between the different parts of the "modern world-system." It is important to the survival of any world system that no one state remain dominant indefinitely, since that will tend in turn to produce a world empire in which the political and economic boundaries of the system are the same. This had happened with previous and transitory world economies but has yet not happened to the modern world system precisely because its basis is capitalist. That is, there is a functional geographical division in the system between economic and political activities. A capitalist world economy is superior to a world empire (and previous world economies) in terms of its ability to accumulate capital, because the tasks of policing the system are not done by any particular area. Core states can instead concentrate on the building of comparative economic advantages to advance capitalism and the world system as a whole. Wallerstein's approach has the advantage of combining both local conditions and systemic, transnational influences into one broad theory of historical change.37
Despite its insights, Wallerstein's work has received only marginal endorsement from American historians.38 Little effort has been made to explore the relevance of Wallerstein for specifically American topics, in which "America" is understood to mean what has become the United States. Yet world-systems theory is important because it enables us to put America's national and regional developments into better focus. The issue of American exceptionalism is largely meaningless within this framework. This is perhaps best seen in the recent work of the economy. For Agnew, the question of American power and its threatened decline in recent years is really a story of these shifting relationships to the world system. As Agnew himself emphasized strongly, the history of the United States seen in such a framework cannot be exceptional or unique. It is significant that such an insightful synthesis has come from a historical geographer. Nonetheless, valid empirical and theoretical objections to Wallerstein's theory have been made.40 Many scholars believe that Wallerstein's model is too rigid to cover the variety of social, cultural, and economic factors that explain how regional competitive advantages take shape within the system. Some critics from the Marxist tradition believe that only class forces within the emergent states can explain the process of capital accumulation and change in the capitalist system over time. As defined by Eugene Genovese and Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, the study of national political economies and their constituent class and ideological forces was undervalued by Wallerstein.41 If, because of the nature of his enterprise, Wallerstein was, on the one hand, insufficiently attentive to internal class and cultural factors, he did not, on the other hand, explore the range and complexity of international influences fully, either. Like other comparativists, he was largely dependent on the existing nation-state historiographies. Wallerstein synthesized this work in a most admirable way and related the economic history of states to the world economy, but he focused in that system on the impersonal economic force of the capitalist marketplace. Relatively little attention has been given by world-system theorists to concrete transnational institutions such as foreign trading companies and the specific financial and monetary mechanisms of the international market economy. 42 Nor does world-systems theory tell us anything about noneconomic factors of a transnational kind that might influence the market. Global pressures are evident in a number of ways: the emergence of a set of interdependent economic relations to which American history could be connected; the related development of communications systems and technology; global environmental constraints, both natural and constructed; systems of alliances and political blocs; the international movements and organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental, that have influenced nation-states; and the growth since the turn of the century of obligations under international law that, in some cases, override national laws. These processes are creating a global context that demonstrates the inadequacy of a national framework for comprehending the present historical circumstances of the United States and that could form the basis of a new approach to important aspects of the American past. I do not propose to discuss each of these in detail.44 Instead, I shall focus first on economic connections, then the environment, and finally organizations, ideologies, and movements to illustrate how American history can be related to transnational influences and how such influences point up the weakness of exceptionalist explanations.
For the development of a transnational project using an American base, the study of the interaction of the American Colonies and republic with the international economic system remains crucial, whatever the weaknesses found in The importance of trading interdependence cannot be easily discounted. In the colonial era, the volume of export trade ranged from 20 to 30 percent of gross national product (GNP), according to the best estimates, and the presence of an imperial system based on mercantilism made the political economy of "foreign trade" of greater importance than even this high volume of trade would suggest. For later periods, the significance of foreign trade declined from its high levels of the colonial and early republican era, and exports as a percentage of GNP never exceeded 7 percent in the nineteenth century. But this figure is rarely set in comparative perspective. In Britain, the ratio of foreign trade to GNP was scarcely 45 Peter Passell, New Economic View, attacked Douglass North's contention that external demand for cotton was the driving force in southern economic expansion, yet they focused only on North's interregional trade argument that southern cotton specialization stimulated midwestern farmers to supplx grain to cotton producers. They failed to assess other aspects of international economic interdependence, such as the role of immigrant labor. They also conceded, ironically, that "the dependence of the East on western foodstuffs does offer some indirect confirmation of North's thesis. Southern cotton production generated export revenues used by the East to purchase foreign capital, and thereby to specialize in nonagricultural production"; p. 151. For a summary of arguments against the North thesis, see also All this is a formidable task for any group of historians yet not an impossible one. The chief obstacles are practical and are connected to the resilience of historiography written from the national point of view. The detailed strategy of execution would demand a separate essay, since changes in historians' ways of producing knowledge are required, but the main points can be swiftly indicated. The growing strength of international connections in the contemporary world will surely make historians reconsider these relationships in past times. The internationalization of scholarship itself is steadily eroding the boundaries that at the turn of the century created strong national historiographical traditions, including American exceptionalism. In part, historians could achieve much along the lines suggested were they simply to build on work already done by the Americanists on international history, comparative history, and regional history discussed in this essay. A new focus on the interplay of global connections and local variations would bring much of this older work into a more helpful relation to current political and economic concerns in ways that would by-pass the temptation to revive exceptionalism. But other strategies are required as well. More could be done by scholarly associations and universities to create institutional frameworks in which these issues could be addressed. Certainly, such tasks cannot be accomplished through individual -action alone. Pooling the talents of historians to explore transnational themes is needed. 
